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"SAME OFFENSE."
JAIMES M9. KERR. -
Codes of California, in six large volumes, and the Consolidated Supplement
thereto (now in press) in two volumes. He has contributed many other books
and articles to legal literature.
1. In General. In the bill of rights and constitutional guaranty
of the Federal and state governments, there are provisions which prohibit
a person from being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; and in
the laws of many of the states there are provisions for an increase in the
punishment to be inflicted upon a second or subsequent conviction for
the same offense. In the protection of the rights of one accused and
presented for trial, and in the determination of the punishment to be
inflicted under statutes providing for an increased penalty on subsequent
conviction, it becomes important to determine what is meant by the
phrase, "same offense."
2. Constitutional Provision-Federal Constitution. The fifth
amendment to the Federal constitution provides, among other things,
as follows: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." In -this provision, the phrase,
'same offense," is equivalent to a declaration of the common-law prin-
ciple that no person shall be twice tried for the same offense, and where
the plea of former jeopardy is entered as a bar by reason of former pro-
ceedings in a prior prosecution, it is required of the court a consider-
ation of whether in fact the patty pleading such bar has before been put
in jeopardy, and if so, whether it can be said to have been for the same
offense. There may be great similarity in facts where there is a sub-
stantial legal difference in the nature of the crimes charged; so, also,
there may be a diversity of circumstances, and yet the legal character of
the offense remain the same. In those cases in which there is a diversity
of circumstances, e. g., of time and place, where time and place are not
necessary ingredients of the crime chhrged-the offenses are to be re-
garded as the same. To constitute identity of offense, it must appear
by the plea that the offense charged was the same, both in law and in
fact.lb If under the first indictment the accused could have been con-
victed on proof of the facts charged in the second indictment, an ac-
quittal or conviction on the first indictment constitutes a bar to a pros-
'Member of the California Bar, Pasadena, Cal. Author of Cyclopedic2See People v. Stephens, 79 Cal. 428, 4 L. R. A. 845, 21 Pac. 856; Com. v.
Roby, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 496; State v. Gustin, 152 Mo. 118, 53 S. W. 421;
R. v. Vandercoiab, 2 Leach, 816.
lbS'ee first part 4.
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ecution under the second indictment, and the plea of former jeopardy
must prevail. 3
3. ame-Construetion of Federal Amendment. The fifth
amendment to the Federal constitution, quoted above, is a limitation
apon the powers of the Federal government, but is not intended to be,
and is not a limitation upon the various states of the union, 4 and state
3Com. v. Roby, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 496; Rex v. Vandercomb, 2 Leach 816.
See foot notes 7-9.
4Fox v. State of Ohio, 46 U. S. (5 How.) 414, 12 L. ed. 213; It re Boggs,
45 Fed. 475.
That the fifth amendment to the Federal constitution, in its entirety, ap-
plies to the Federal government only, and is not a limitation upon the states,
is well settled by the weight of decision-see authorities collected in Kerr's
Consolidated Supplement to Kerr's Cyc., Cal. Codes §§ 10-21, Pen. Code part
and other cases: Livingston v. Moore, 32 U. S. (7 Pet.) 469, 8 L. ed. 751,
affirming Baldw. 424, Fed. Cas. No. 8,416; Barron use of Tiernan v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U. S. (7 Pet.) 243, 8 L. ed. 672; Fox v. State of Ohio, 46 U. S.
(5 How.) 410, 12 L. ed. 213; Smith v. Maryland, 59 U. S. (18 How.) 71, 15 L. ed.
269; Per'ear v. Massachusetts, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 475, 18 L. ed. 608; Twitchell
v. Pennsylvania, 84 U. S. (7 Wall.) 321, 19 L. ed. 223; Withers v. Buckley, 87
U. S. (20 How.) 84, 15 L. ed. 816, affirming 29 Miss. 21, 64 Am. Dec. 126;
Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 532, 22 L. ed. 487, affirming 36 N. J. L.
449, 13 Am. Rep. 463; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U, S. 552, 23 L. ed. 591,
affirming 1 Woods 308, Fed. Cas. No. 14,897; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78,
28 L. ed. 658, affirming 85 Pa. St. 170, 25 Am. Rep. 633; Presser v. Illinois, 116
U. S. 252, 29 L. ed. 615, 6 Sup. Ct. 580; Spies v, Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, 31 L.
ed. 80, 8 Sup. Ct. 22, dismissing error to 122 Ill. 1, 3 Am. St. Rep. 320, 6 Am.
Crim. Rep. 570, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898; Re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 31 L. id.
402, 8 Sup. Ct. 482; Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U. S. 31, 33 L. ed. 801,
10 Sup. Ct. 424, affirming 69 Iowa 240, 28 N. W. 551; McElvaine v. Brush, 142
U. S. 155, 35 L. ed. 971, 12 Sup. Ct. 156; O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 360, 30
L. ed. 466, 12 Sup. Ct. 393, dismissing error to 58 Vt 140, 56 Am. Rep. 557,- 2
At. 586; Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314, 36 L. ed. 986, 13 Sup. Ct. 105;
Thorington v. Montgomery, 147 U. S. 490, 37 L. ed. 252, 13 Sup. Ct. 349, dis-
missing error to 94 Ala. 266, 10 So. 634; Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United
States, 148 U. S. 312, 37 L. ed. 463, 13 Sup. Ct. 622; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.
S. 591, 40 L. ed. 819, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, affirming 70 Fed. 46; Talton v. Mayes, 163
U. S. 376, 41 L. ed. 196, 16 Sup. Ct. 986; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172,
44 L. ed. 119, 20 Sup. Ct. 77, affirming 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 AtI. 811; Bolln v.
Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83, 44 L. ed. 382, 20 Sup. Ct. 287, affirming 51 Neb. 581, 71
N. W. 444; Capitol City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 46 L. ed. 171, 22 Sup.
Ct. 120, affirming 62 Ohio St. 350, 57 L. R. A. 181, 57 N. E. 62; Ohio ex rel.
Loyd v. Dollinson, 194 U. S. 445, 48 L. ed. 1062, 24 Sup. Ct. 703, affirming 68
Ohio St. 688, 70 N. E. 1131; United States v. Rhodes, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 28, Fed.
Cas. No. 16,151; United States v. Hall, 3 Chicago Leg. News 260, Fed. Cas. No.
15,282; Clark v. Dick, 1 Dill. 8, Fed. Cas. No. 2,818; Santa Clara County v.
Souther Pac. R. Co., 18 Fed. 389; Kansas v. Bradley, 26 Fed. 289; ex pailte
Ulrich, 42 Fed. 589; It re Boggs, 45 Fed. 475; Clark v. Russell, 97 Fed. 902;
Williams v. Hert, 110 Fed. 168; St. Louis, I. M. and S. R. Co. v. Davis, 132
Fed. 629; Grifing v. Gibb, McAll. 212, Fed. Cas. No. 5,819; United States v.
Keen, 1 McL. 429, Fed. Cas. No. 15,510; Philadelphia and R. R. Co. v. Mor-
rison, 5 Phila. 522, Fed. Cas. No. 11,089; Boring v. Williams, 17 Ala. 516; Fife
v. State, 31 Ark. 458, 25 Am. Rep. 566; Ryan v. People, 21 Colo. 122, 40 Pac.
775; Colt v. Eves, 12 Con. 251; Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 369; Keith v. Henkel-
man. 173 Ill. 143, 50 N. E. 692; Lake Erie, W. and St. L. R. Co. v. Teath, 9 Ind.
559; Griffli v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 384; Butler v. State, 97 Ind. 382; State v. Coiner,
717
JAMES M. KERR
statutes which provide for an increased punishment upon a second or
subsequent conviction for the "same offense," are not in conflict with
this amendment to the Federal constitution.5
The phrase, "same offense," as used in this amendment, means an
offense which is the same both in law and in fact,6 and includes not
only identity in the act constituting the offense charged, but also
identity in the form, nature, and effect of the provision therefore.7
4. Same-C:-onstruction of State Constitutions. Under the vari-
ous state constitutions containing provisions that no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, the phrase "same offense" is
held to mean "the same criminal act,"8 and includes not only identity
of the act constituting the offense charged, but also identity in the
form, nature, and effect of the provision therefore ;9 yet it does not sig-
157 Ind. 611, 62 N. E. 452; State v. Height, 117 Iowa 654, 94 Am. St. Rep. 323,
59 L. R. A. 440, 91 N. W. 935; Jane v. Cont., 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 18; State v. Jack-
son, 21 La. Ann. 574; State v. Carro, 26 La. Ann. 377; State v. Anderson, 30
La. Ann. 559; Weimer v. Bimbury, 30 Mich. 208; State v. Kaub, 19 Mo. App.
150; State v. MacQueen, 69 N. J. L. 527, 55 Atl. 1006; State ex rel. Lewinsohn
v. O'Brien, 176 N. Y. 261, 68 N. E. 353; Murphy v. People, 2 Cow (N. Y.) 815;
Jackson v. Wood, 2 Cow (N. Y.) 819; People v. Penhollow, 42 Hun. (N. Y.)
106; People ex rel. Keniler v. Durston, 55 Hun. (N. Y.) 68, 7 N. Y. Supp.
813; Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 22 Am. Dec. 622; State v.
Nusan, 27 N. C. (5 Ired. L.) 351; State v. Caldwell, 115 N. C. 803, 20 S. E.
523; State v. Patterson, 134 N. C. 618, 47 S. E. 808; Re Briggs, 135 N. C. 121,
47 S. E. 403; Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184, 2 Am. Rep. 388; Territory v.
Stroud, 6 Okla. 111, 50 Pac. 265; State v. Paul, 5 R. I. 185; State v. Keeran, 5
R. I. 497; In re Fitzpatrick, 16 R. I. 60; State v. Schirer, 20 S. C. 404; State v.
Atkins, 40 S. C. 363, 42 Am. St. Rep. 877, 18 S. E. 1021; State ex rel. George v.
Aiken, 42 S. C. 246, 26 L. R. A. 358, 20 S. E. 221; State v. Brennan, 2 S. D.
388, 50 N. W. 625; Andrews u. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 172, 8 Am. Rep. 8;
Cox v. State, 8 Tex. App. 285, 34 Am. Rep. 746; Pitner v. State, 23 Tex. App.
366, 5 S. W. 210; Martin-v. Johnson, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 634, 33 S. W. 306;
Mischer v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 220, 96 Am. St. Rep. 780, 53 S. W. 627; Re Mc-
Kee, 19 Utah 235, 57 Pac. 23; Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 268, 45 L.
R. A. 628, 57 Pac. 1; State v. Hodgson, 66 Vt. 156, 28 Atl. 1089; State v. Keyes,
8 Vt. 57, 30 Am. Dec. 450; Miller v. Com., 88 Va. 623, 15 L. R. A. 444, 14 S.
E. 161; State v. Nordstrom, 7 Wash. 508, 35 Pac. 382; Ex parte McNeely, 36
W. Va. 96, 32 Am. St. Rep. 831, 15 L. R. A. 230, 14 S. E. 436.
5See infra, part 5.
6United States v. Cashiel, 1 Hughes 552, Fed. Cal. No. 14,744.
The phrase "same offense," as used in the bill of rights, providing that no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense, has
been construed by some courts to mean "the same criminal act," and by others
the contrary 'has been held. The proper construction seems to be that where
the criminal act is at one and the same time an offense against the laws of the
state and also. against the laws of the United States, the words "same offense"
are properly interpreted otherwise than as being equivalent to the words "same
criminal act."--Moundsville v. Fountain, 27 W. Va. 182, 195, 197.
7 See post, part 5.
sPeople v. Stephens, 79 Cal. 428, 4 L. R. A. 845, 21 Pac. 856.
9 State v. Gustin, 152 Mo. 118, 53 S. W. 421. See Com. v. Roby, 29 Mass.
(12 Pick.) 496; Rex v. Vandercomb, 2 Leach 816.
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nify the same offense eo nominie, but simply the same criminal act or
omission.',
5. Act and Offense Under Two Systems of Law. We have al-
ready seen that by the phrase, "same offense," in the fifth amendment
to the Federal constitution, is meant such an offense as is the same
both in law and in fact." The question has been raised as to the ap-
plication of the amendment in those cases in which the same act and
set of facts is an offense both under the Federal laws and the statutes
of a state; as in the case of a charge of counterfeiting coin of the
United States, and also the charge of passing counterfeit money-both
of which offenses are punishable, alike, by acts of Congress and state
statutes.
Speaking to this point, Mr. Justice McLean, in the case of Fox v.
The State of Ohio,2 says: "Each government has defined the crime
and affixed the punishment, without reference to the action of any
other jurisdiction. And the question arises whether, in such cases,
where the Federal government has an undoubted jurisdiction, and state
government can punish the same act. The point is not whether the
state may not punish an act an offense undfer the act of Congress, but
whether the state may inflict, by virtue of its own sovereignty, punish-
ment for the same act as an offense against the. state, which the Fed-
eral government may constitutionally punish. If this be so, it is a
great defect in our system. For the punishment under the state law
would be no bar to a prosecution under the law of Congress. And to
punish the same act by the two governments would violate, not only the
common principles of humanity, but would be repugnant to the nature
of both governments. If there were a cQncurrent power in both gov-
ernments to punish the same act, a. conviction under the law of
either could be pleaded in bar to a prosecution of the other." But in
the later case of Moore v. The People of Illinois, 3 it is decided that it
is no objection to state legislation that the offender may be liable to
punishment under an act of Congress. The court says: "Every cit-'
izen of the United States is also a citizen of a state or territory. He
may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to
punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may
be an offense or transgression of the laws of both. Thus, an assault
upon the marshal of the United States, or hindering him in the exe-
lOHirsficld v. State, 11 Tex. App. 207, 214.
"See foot notes 8 to 10, and text going therewith.
1246 U. S. (5 How.) 410, 438, 12 L. ed. 213, 225.1355 U. S. (14 How.) 13, 20, 14 L. ed. 306, 309.
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cution of legal process, is a high offense against the United States, for
which the perpetrator is liable to punishment; and the same act may be
also a gross breach of the peace of the state, a riot, assault, or a mur-
der, and subject the same person to a punishment, under the state
laws, for a misdemeanor or felony. That either or both may (if they
see fit) punish such an offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be
truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same
offense; but only that by one act he has committed two offenses, for
each of which he is justly, punishable."
The last case is in harmony with the great weight of decision
which is, as we have seen,14 to the effect that the fifth amendment to
the Federal constitution is not a limitation on the state. Hence if an
act is an offense at one and the same time against two systems of law-
.. g., against the acts of Congress and state statutes-a trial and con-
viction under one cannot be pleaded in bar of a trial on an indictment
under the other. In accordance with this principle, it. has been held
that where an act is an offense both against the articles of war and also
against the criminal law, a trial and acquittal in one court will not be
a bar to a prosecution in the other.15  There are numerous cases hold-
ing to the view that a conviction or acquittal in a proceedings by court-
martial will not constitute a bar to proceedings in a criminal court for
one and the same offense, and vice versa.'6
6. Prosecution Cannot Split up a Crime. The state cannot split
up a crime and prosecute it in parts, and a prosecution for any part of
a single crime bars any former prosecution based upon the whole or a
part of such crime.' The rule is well settled that where an offense is
a necessary event in and constitutes an essential part of another of-
fense, and both are in fact but one transaction, a conviction or acquittal
on a charge of one is a bar for a prosecution on a charge of the other.,
Thus a conviction of battery bars a subsequent prosecution for an of-
fense included therein ;19 a conviction of assault is a bar to a subsequent
'4See foot note 4.
-sUnited States v. Casiel, 1 Hughes 552, Fed. Cas. No. 14,744.
16 Wilkes v. Dinsinan, 48 U. S. (7 ,How.) 123, 12 L. ed. 618; Coleman v.
Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509, 24 L. ed. 1018; United States v. Clark, 31 Fed. 715;
In re Fair, 100 Fed. 151; United States v. Cashiel, I Hughes 552, Fed. Cas. No.
14,744.
Jackson v. State, 14 Ind. 327.
'sState v. Smith, 43 Vt. 324.
'
9People v. McDaniels, 137 Cal. 195, 92 Am. St. Rep. 81, 59 L. R. A. 579,
96 Pac. 106. .
And a conviction of assault and battery bars a prosecution assault and
battery with intent to murder. committed by same act.-Moore v. State, 71 Ala.
302; State v. Hattenbough, 66 Ind. 223.
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prosecution for mayhem committed during such assault ;20 a conviction
on a charge of assault and battery is a bar to a subsequent prosecution
for an assault to commit murder growing out of the same act ;21 an
indictment and acquittal in a charge of criminal libel in the use of cer-
tain words contained in a published article, is a bar to a subsequent
prosecution for criminal libel in the use of other words contained in
the same article, published at the same time and in the same news-
paper; 22 and where a person was indicted for having in his possession
a forged bank note or bill of the Troy Bank, with intention to alter
and pass the same, and to defraud the said bank, he pleaded a former
indictment for having in his possession a bank note of the Mechanics'
Bank, with intent to alter and pass the same to defraud the Mechanics'
Bank, upon which said indictment, he had been found guilty, and judg-
ment thereon was impending; the court held this plea a bar to the pro-
ceedings on the indictment for having in his possession the bank note
of the Troy Bank, for the reason that the act of passing the several
notes was one and the same offense, as much as the act of stealing a
number of articles at the same time and place, and the indictment
should have specified each note which the prisoner had in his possession.
The court alleging that if this had been done, there could not have
been several punishments inflicted, and for that reason the offense was
"one and the same offense." 23
It is a well settled principle of criminal law that a person cannot
be convicted and punished for two distinct felonies growing out of the
same identical act or transaction, where one is a necessary ingredient
of the other ;24 that is to say, the law does not permit a single individ-
ual act to be divided, so as to make out of it two distinct indictable
6ffenses.25 Thus, in a case where, by one and the same act, and with
the same intent, the accused took a horse, wagon, and harness, the
property of A, and two indictments were returned against him, one
for stealing the horse, and the other for stealing the wagon and harness,
and on a trial under the first indictment he was acquitted, this ac-
20People v. Defoor, 100 Cal. 155, 34 Pac. 642.21People v. McDaniels, 137 Cal. 192, 92 Am. St. Rep. 81, 59 L. R_ A. 578,
95 Pac. 106. See Moore v. State, 71 Ala. 307; People v. DeFoor, 100 Cal. 150,
34 Pac. 642; Moundsville v. Fountain, 27 W. Va. 182.22People v. Stephens, 79 Cal. 428, 4 L. R. A. 845, 21 Pac. 856.23State v. Benham, 7 Con. 414. See King v. Sutton, Cas. temp. Hardw. 372.24State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. (I Green) 361, 25 Am. Dec. 490.
Even though one offense is higher than the other.-Stevens v. State, 19
Neb. 647, 28 N. W. 304.
Thus an acquittal of a charge of burning a mill is a bar to a subsequent
prosecution for burning any of the contents thereof.-State v. Colgate, 31 Kan.
511, 47 Am. Rep. 507, 3 Pac. 346.
25Drake v. State, 60 Ala. 43.
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quittal was held to be, on plea, a bar to a trial under the second indict-
ment for stealing the wagon and harness.26 Where a person is pros-
ecuted on an indictment charging burglary, accompanied by actual com-
mission of larceny, and convicted of larceny, only, on a second indict-
ment, charging burglary growing out of the same state of facts, it was
held that the first conviction was a bar to a trial under the second in-
dictment;27 and a conviction of assault to murder bars a subsequent
prosecution for robbery committed by means of the same assault.28  An
acquittal on a charge of statutory rape, has been held to bar a subse-
quent prosecution on a charge of incest with the same girl, although
the act relied on in the latter indictment was of a different date.2 9
But it is held in State v. Elder 0 that an acquittal on a charge of
murder of an unborn child through attempted abortion by the mother,
is not a bar to a prosecution for such attempt to produce a miscarriage;
in Wilson v. State,"' that a conviction on a charge of larceny is not a
bar to a subsequent prosecution under an indictment charging burglar-
iously breaking aid entering a store with intent to steal, both being
committed a* the same time; in Maim v. Commonwealth,32 that a con-
viction of shoating while committing burglary is not a bar to a subse-
quent prosecution under an indictment charging the burglary; and in
Teat v. State,33 that an indictment for the murder of one person is no
bar to an indictment for mortally wounding another party at the same
time.
7. When Constitutional Provision May be Invokced. A party is not
entitled to plead the prohibition of the constitutional provision that no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense unless the
second jeopardy is for the identical offense involved in the first triall3
and where a person could not be convicted on a second indictment un-
der evidence which would be sufficient to convict under the first indict-
2 6Fisher v. Calm, 1 Bush (Ky.) 211, 89 Am. Dec. 620. See same principle
State v. Clarke, 32 Ark. 231; Williams v. Com., 78 Ky. 93; Triplett v. Com., 84
Ky. 193, 1 S. W. 84; State v. McCormack, 8 Or. 236.27State v. Lewis, 9 N. C. (2 Hawks.) 98, 11 Am. Dec. 741, approved and
followed in Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 8; People v. Smith, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 46.28Herera v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 607, 34 S. W. 943.2 9State v. Price, 127 Iowa 301, 103 N. W. 195.
2065 Ind. 282, 32 Am. Rep. 69.
3124 Conn. 57.
22118 Ky. 67, 111 Am. St. Rep. 289, 80 S. W. 438.
8s53 Miss. 439, 24 Am. Rep. 708.
34Thus where a person is tried on a charge of stealing goods, the property
of A, this will not be a bar to a subsequent trial on a charge of stealing goods,
the property of B, for the reason that the evidence essential to support the first
-charge would necessarily destroy the second charge, and vice versa.-State v.
Williams, 45 La. Ann. 936, 12 So. 932.
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ment, a conviction or an acquittal under the first indictment cannot be
interposed by way of a plea of former jeopardy. Thus where a person
is indicted on a charge of selling liquor to a minor, and is subsequently
indicted and tried for a sale of liquor without license, the evidence re-
quired to convict under the second indictment will not be sufficient to
convict under the first indictment, and the two offenses charged in the
two indictments are not the same offense, although they were committed
by one and the same act of sale.35 In those cases where the evidence is
not conflicting, whether or not the transaction is one and the same, is a
question for the jury, under a plea of former acquittal."
35State v. Gapen, 17 Ind. App. 524, 47 N. E. 35.36Cook v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 188, 96 Am. St. Rep. 854, 63 S. W. 872.
